Environmental Law by Deatherage, Scott D.
SMU Law Review




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation





I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 239
II. CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS FOR COSTS INCURRED
TO CLEANUP CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES
UNDER TEXAS LAW ................................... 240
A. CLAIM UNDER THE TEXAS SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL
A CT .................................................... 240
B. CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE TEXAS WATER CODE .... 244
III. STANDING TO CHALLENGE ACTIONS THAT MAY
IMPACT THE ENVIRONMENT ......................... 245
A. ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND ASSOCIATIONAL
STANDING UNDER TEXAS STATUTES .................. 245
B. CORPORATE INTERVENTION IN LITIGATION OVER
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS TO PROTECT PROPERTY
R IG HTS ............................................... 249
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................... 251
I. INTRODUCTIONENVIRONMENTAL litigation over the large number of federal
and state environmental statutes, common law claims, and con-
tract claims continues to present interesting issues for attorneys
and judges. During the Survey period, numerous cases were decided by
courts applying state and federal environmental laws in disputes between
parties in Texas. Some of the most interesting cases involve the question
of when a party has the right to challenge a governmental or private ac-
tion that affects the environment. Not all parties have the ability to chal-
lenge actions they feel are adversely impacting the environment. Courts
at the federal level and state level have been addressing the question of
standing since the first environmental statutes were passed in the 1970s.
In several Texas cases, the courts considered which parties have standing
in several contexts.
The Aviall series of decisions, a series of cases including a case decided
during the Survey period, following the decision in the U.S. Supreme
Court a few years ago under the federal Comprehensive Environmental
* Scott D. Deatherage is a partner in the Dallas office of Patton Boggs. He received
his JD from Harvard Law School cum laude in 1987, and his B.A. in Letters with highest
honors from the University of Oklahoma.
SMU LAW REVIEW
Response, Compensation and Liability Act, addressed several state law
claims including the elements of a contribution claim under the Texas
Solid Waste Disposal Act.1 The court also considered other claims under
the Texas Water Code, contract law, and quantum meruit.
The cases heard by Texas courts provide insights into the ability to
challenge environmental actions or to recover costs for the impact of en-
vironmental conditions.
II. CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS FOR COSTS INCURRED TO
CLEANUP CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES
UNDER TEXAS LAW
The litigation between Aviall Services, Inc. ("Aviall") and Cooper In-
dustries, LLC ("Cooper") over contamination of four sites in the Dallas
area has gone on for many years, and one issue in the litigation reached
the U.S. Supreme Court.2 The litigation set precedent for claims under
the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"). The case reviewed for the Survey period
addressed claims brought by Aviall against Cooper under state as op-
posed to federal claims. Aviall brought claims under the Texas Solid
Waste Disposal Act ("TSWDA"), the Texas Water Code, contract law,
and quantum meruit.3 The issues raised in this case are an important
aspect of the ability to recover costs incurred for cleaning up contami-
nated sites.
A. CLAIM UNDER THE TEXAS SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT
The main claim arose under a private right of action provision under
the TSWDA.4 While other claims were asserted, the claim of most signif-
icance was the TSWDA cost recovery action. There have not been many
cases in Texas reviewing the elements of this statutory cause of action.
Often in environmental litigation, the first defense is the assertion of
the running of the statute of limitations. In this case, Cooper argued that
Aviall's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and that a two-
year statute of limitations applied.5 Cooper argued that since Aviall
bought Cooper's business and the employees of Cooper became the em-
ployees of Aviall, knowledge of those former Cooper employees became
knowledge of Aviall.6 The sale closed in 1981 and Cooper therefore ar-
gued the statute of limitations expired before the parties entered into the
statute of limitations tolling agreement in 1996.7
1. See, e.g., Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus. LLC, 572 F. Supp. 2d 676, 676 (N.D.
Tex. 2008).
2. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 157 (2004).
3. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., LLC, 694 F. Supp. 2d 567, 567 (N.D. Tex.
2010).
4. Id. at 573.





The court concluded that the 1997 amendment to the TSWDA created
a claim for parties engaged in remediation under an agreement (now
known as the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ)),
rather than make the party wait until an administrative or judicial order is
issued commanding the plaintiff to take action and remediate a contami-
nated site. The court concluded that the cause of action did not exist until
1997 when the TSWDA was amended and that its application to a release
of contaminants prior to that time frame did not violate any constitu-
tional bar against retroactive claims. 8 The court ruled that remedial stat-
utes are applied retroactively under Texas case law. 9 In order to
determine whether Aviall had a claim, the court turned to how "remedial
statutes" are defined and whether the TSWDA is a remedial statute. The
court reviewed the legislature's stated purpose of the TSWDA to "safe-
guard the health, welfare, and physical property of the people and to pro-
tect the environment by controlling the management of solid waste."'10
The court concluded that the statute is remedial, citing other Texas cases
reaching the same conclusion."
An exception applies if the retroactive application of the statute would
deny the defendant of a vested right. The court held, however, that the
1997 amendment created the cause of action, so the limitations defense
was not voided. 12 Therefore, the retroactive application of the statute
was not unconstitutional. 13
The review of the elements of a claim under this provision of the
TSWDA, even if by a federal court rather than a Texas court, provides an
interesting analysis for environmental practitioners. 14 The court identi-
fied the elements of Aviall's claim under the TSWDA against Cooper.
These elements are critical for parties seeking to recover environmental
cleanup costs, as well as those who are defending against such claims.15
The elements outlined in the case were as follows:
(1) [Cooper] is a "person responsible for solid waste" as defined in
[Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §] 361.271; (2) the TNRCC ap-
proved [Aviall's] removal or remedial action; (3) the action was nec-
essary to address a release or threatened release of solid waste; (4)
the costs of the action were reasonable and necessary; and (5) [Avi-
all] made reasonable attempts to notify [Cooper] of both the release
8. Id. at 577.
9. Id. at 579 (citing Ex parte Abell, 613 S.W.2d 255, 258 (Tex. 1981); Phil H. Pierce
Co. v. Watkins, 263 S.W. 905, 907 (Tex. 1924); In re Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 71 S.W.3d 446, 450 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, orig. proceeding) (per curiam);
Lukes v. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Tex., 59 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet.)).
10. Id. (quoting TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 364.002(a) (West 2001)).
11. Id. (citing R.R. Street & Co. v. Pilgrim Enters., Inc., 81 S.W.3d 276, 291 (Tex.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2001, pet. granted) ("R.R. Street I") ("Because it is a remedial
statute, we must give SWDA a liberal construction, rather than one that would defeat the
very purpose for which it was enacted.")).
12. Id. at 581.
13. Id. at 580.




and [Aviall's] intent to take steps to eliminate the release. 16
Cooper challenged Aviall's claim under the TSWDA asserting that
Aviall had not made reasonable attempts to notify Cooper of its plans to
perform remediation at the properties before commencing the remedia-
tion. The court ruled that Aviall had given notice, and that a jury would
have to determine whether that notice was reasonable, thus, a summary
judgment on the point was not appropriate. 17
Cooper also argued that Aviall could not recover for the remediation
of contamination caused by the release of non-hazardous wastes. Recov-
ery may be made for a "removal or remedial action," as defined by apply-
ing the terms to "hazardous waste." 18 However, the federal district court
believed that the Texas Supreme Court has ruled that parties may recover
under the private right of action provision of the TSWDA for removal or
remedial actions to address contamination caused by solid waste.19
The court reviewed sections of the TSWDA. The focus was on the def-
initions of "remedial action" and "removal." The court concluded that a
"remedial action" can only address "hazardous waste" releases. 20 The
court concluded that the term "removal" was not limited to actions that
address a release of hazardous waste.21 The court noted that many of the
16. Id. (citing R.R. Street & Co., 166 S.W.3d at 240 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 361.344) (West 2005))).
17. Id. at 581.
18. Id. at 582.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 584 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.003(29) (West 1997).
Section 361.003(29) states "Remedial action' means an action consistent with a permanent
remedy taken instead of or in addition to a removal action in the event of a release or
threatened release of a hazardous waste into the environment to prevent or minimize the
release of hazardous waste so that the hazardous waste does not migrate to cause an immi-
nent and substantial danger to present or future public health and safety or the environ-
ment. The term includes:
(A) actions at the location of the release, including storage, confinement,
perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutraliza-
tion, cleanup of released hazardous waste or contaminated materials, re-
cycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive waste,
dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collec-
tion of leachate and runoff, on-site treatment or incineration, provision of
alternate water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure
that those actions protect the public health and safety or the environment;
and
(B) the costs of permanent relocation of residents, businesses, and commu-
nity facilities if the administrator of the United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency or the executive director determines that, alone or in
combination with other measures, the relocation:
(i) is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the trans-
portation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition off-site of
hazardous waste; or
(ii) may otherwise be necessary to protect the public health or safety.")
21. Id. (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.003(30) (West 1997), "Re-
moval" includes:
(A) cleaning up or removing released hazardous waste from the
environment;
(B) taking necessary action in the event of the threat of release of hazardous
waste into the environment;
[Vol. 64
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actions described in the definition of "removal" were not limited to ac-
tions relating to hazardous waste.22
The court also noted that the issuance of an administrative order by the
TCEQ could result in cleanup of a non-hazardous solid waste, thus al-
lowing a private right of action for non-hazardous solid waste. The court
was unwilling to grant Cooper's summary judgment on the ground that
the cause of action did not apply to non-hazardous solid waste.23
The next element of the claim by Aviall was that the costs expended to
address the release of the solid waste were reasonable and necessary.
Aviall sought summary judgment arguing the approval by the TCEQ
(then known as the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission)
established the costs were reasonable and necessary. 24 The court turned
to the Texas Supreme Court's review of these issues in RR Street I. On
the one hand, the holding by the Texas Supreme Court appears to be that
agency approval is sufficient to show that costs are reasonable and neces-
sary.25 In R.R. Street I, the federal district court noted that the Texas
Supreme Court also held that "reasonable and necessary" was established
by "showing that costs are (1) incurred in response to a threat to human
health or the environment, and (2) necessary to address that threat. '26
The district court noted that the Northern District of Texas held in a sepa-
rate decision that agency approval alone was not sufficient to meet this
test.27 The district court concluded that Cooper has put forth evidence
that some of the costs were not reasonable and that Aviall had not proven
that all costs were reasonable, and thus a summary judgment was not
appropriate. 28
The district court then turned to the question of Cooper's liability. The
court went through the elements of the case. First, the court concluded
that Cooper was a person responsible for solid waste because Cooper
owned the property at the time that disposal of waste occurred.29 Sec-
(C) taking necessary action to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or
threat of release of hazardous waste;
(D) disposing of removed material;
(E) erecting a security fence or other measure to limit access;
(F) providing alternate water supplies, temporary evacuation, and housing
for threatened individuals not otherwise provided for;
(G) acting under Section 104(b) of the environmental response law;
(H) providing emergency assistance under the federal Disaster Relief Act of
1974 (42 U.S.C. Section 5121 et seq.); or
(I) taking any other necessary action to prevent, minimize, or mitigate dam-
age to the public health and welfare or the environment that may otherwise
result from a release or threat of release.).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 584-86.
24. Id. at 585.
25. R.R. Street 1, 81 S.W.3d at 302.
26. Id. at 301.
27. Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus. LLC, 694 F. Supp. 2d 567, 585 (citing Am. Int'l
Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 3:08-CV-807-M, 2010 WL 184444, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 19, 2010)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 586.
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ond, the court held that the agency approved the actions taken by Avi-
all. 30 Third, the court found that Availl showed that its actions were
necessary to address the release of solid waste.31 Fourth, the court held
that at least some of Aviall's costs were reasonable and necessary.
32
Fifth, the court ruled that Aviall made reasonable efforts to notify
Cooper of its actions prior to conducting them. 33 Sixth, the court con-
cluded that at least some of Aviall's costs were necessary to protect public
health, meaning they met the definition of "removal" under the
TSWDA.34 As a result of meeting these elements, the court granted par-
tial summary judgment to Aviall as to Cooper's liability under the
TSWDA.3 5
Aviall also sought attorneys' fees in the case. The district court consid-
ered both the language of the TSWDA that parties may recover other
costs and the evaluation of the ability to recover costs under CERCLA,
the federal statute allowing private rights of action for costs incurred in
addressing hazardous substances releases.36 The court ruled that Aviall
may recover certain attorneys' fees for work related to the site, but not
for litigation expenses. 37
B. CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE TEXAS WATER CODE
Aviall also sought recovery under Texas Water Code section 26.3513.
This section allows parties to seek contribution where storage tanks are
owned by multiple parties, or there is more than one petroleum storage
tank, or a combination of both cases. 38 The court analyzed Aviall's argu-
ments and the statutory language, and concluded that the language ap-
plied to current owners, not past owners. The court granted summary
judgment to Cooper and dismissed the claim under the Texas Water
Code. 39
This opinion in the Aviall litigation sheds further light on the contribu-
tion action provided under the TSWDA. Though the provision has been
in existence for many years, the number of cases interpreting this right of
action is limited. The Texas Supreme Court has considered the aspects of
the claim in two cases involving the same parties. The elements. of the
cause of action are, at best, inconsistent. The federal district court consid-
ered the issue of whether claims can be brought for releases of solid waste
or were limited only to hazardous waste. The district court also consid-
ered the issue of whether agency approval is all that is needed to meet the
30. Id.
31. Id. at 587.
32. Id. at 588.
33. Id. at 586.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 587.
37. Id. at 586.
38. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.3513 (West 2010).
39. See Aviall Servs., Inc., 694 F. Supp. at 588-89.
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requirement that costs for addressing environmental conditions are rea-
sonable and necessary. This cause of action will likely be reviewed again
in future litigation over the costs to clean up contaminated properties.
III. STANDING TO CHALLENGE ACTIONS THAT MAY
IMPACT THE ENVIRONMENT
The question presented is to what extent a party should have the right
to participate as an affected person to determine whether it could be ad-
versely affected, or stated in the alternative, to what extent the eviden-
tiary question of whether a party is adversely affected should be
considered prior to that party being allowed to participate in the proceed-
ing. The courts allowed the TCEQ to make this determination at the
earlier stage prior to being allowed to be playing a role in the proceeding.
The agency's approach and the court's approval of that approach may
serve to limit participation in permit proceedings at the TCEQ.
A. ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AND ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING UNDER
TEXAS STATUTES
The assessment of whether a party has standing to challenge govern-
mental action on environmental protection grounds has evolved since
federal and state environmental statutes were first passed in the 1920s.
At the federal level, courts have consistently recognized that federal stat-
utes grant standing to citizen suits raised by parties with more general
environmental concerns. 40 At the state level, however, where Texas envi-
ronmental statutes lack similar citizen suit provisions, traditional notions
of standing make it more difficult to file suit where direct injury to prop-
erty or persons are not at issue.41 A decision issued during the Survey
period shines new light on the difficulties faced by citizen groups advanc-
ing claims alleging general environmental harms.
The federal jurisprudence on standing begins with a review of the Con-
stitution's case-or-controversy limitation in Article III Section 2 on fed-
eral judicial authority. This leads to the analysis of the standing of a party
to bring a claim in federal court. 42 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,43
the Supreme Court held that to satisfy this standing requirement under
Article III, the plaintiff in a case must demonstrate three things: (1) it has
"suffered an 'injury in fact' which is (a) concrete and particularized...
and (b) actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical'"; (2) "the
injury ... has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant.. ."; and (3) "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'specu-
40. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 167 (2007).
41. See, e.g., City of Waco v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-09-00005-CV,
2011 WL 2437669, at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin June 17, 2011, no pet.).
42. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 168.
43. 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
2011]
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lative,' that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."' 44 For an
association, it must have members who have standing to sue, the issues in
the case must be germane to the purpose of the organization, and the
claim and relief cannot require the participation of the individual mem-
bers as individualized claims.45
What must be kept in mind is that many federal environmental statutes
contain "citizen suit" provisions. These provisions specifically grant a cit-
izen, a group of citizens, or an association the right to bring suit to chal-
lenge certain actions of private or governmental parties. 46 One of the
more well known provisions is the citizen suit under the federal Clean
Water Act, which has resulted in significant litigation and many federal
court decisions that have interpreted standing and the scope of citizen
suit provisions.47 The Clean Water Act citizen suit provision begins with
a statement that "any citizen may commence a civil action on his own
behalf" and cites the particular governmental or private action or inac-
tion that the citizen may challenge in court under this provision.48 Thus,
the citizen suit provision provides under federal law, and some state laws,
that a citizen may act in a manner similar to a "private attorney general"
role where the federal government is not acting against a private party or
where the government is not fulfilling its statutory duty.49 These types of
claims extend the ability and standing of private citizens to use the courts
to seek redress for environmental injury or enforcement of federal envi-
ronmental laws.
These provisions may not exist in state laws, and are not typically per-
mitted under Texas environmental statutes. In Save Our Springs Alli-
ance, Inc. v. City of Dripping Springs, the Austin Court of Appeals
addressed the question of whether the Save Our Springs Alliance (S.O.S.)
had sufficient associational standing for the trial court to hear its claims.50
S.O.S. was a non-profit corporation whose mission was to protect the
Barton Spring segment of the Edwards Aquifer.51 The organization filed
suit against the City of Dripping Springs and two developers challenging
the legitimacy of separate (but largely identical) development agreements
between the city and each of the developers. 52 An essential element of
the S.O.S. challenge was its allegation that the proposed developments
would be located in the Edwards Aquifer "recharge zone," and that the
development authorized by the development agreements would result in
an increase in pollution in the Edwards Aquifer and Barton Springs.
53
44. Id.
45. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
46. See Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 168.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2010).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 304 S.W.3d 871, 877-78 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, pet. denied).
51. Id. at 876.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 879. More substantively, S.O.S. challenged the Development Agreements
on the grounds that they "violate[d] the Texas Constitution by impinging on the right of
[Vol. 64
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The district court granted the defendants' "pleas to the jurisdiction" and
dismissed the S.O.S. challenge for lack of standing.54
Hearing the case on appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals agreed that
the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the challenge
because S.O.S. lacked associational standing to challenge the Develop-
ment Agreements on behalf of its members.55 It framed the general test
for standing to be an assessment of whether there is a real controversy
between the parties, focusing on the question of "who may bring a law-
suit."' 56 Under this assessment, S.O.S. would have associational standing
where members of the organization would otherwise have standing to sue
in their own right, the interests the organization seeks to protect are ger-
mane to its purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief re-
quested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.57
The Texas test is the same as the federal test developed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court and discussed above.
For S.O.S. and other organizations basing claims on generalized envi-
ronmental concerns under Texas law, the first prong of this analysis can
be especially problematic. The first prong provides that an organization
will have standing if one of its members would have standing individu-
ally.58 Here, the Austin Court of Appeals looked to the three-part test
for individual standing set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, which requires that (1) the plaintiff suffered an "in-
jury in fact"-an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete
and particularized, and actual or imminent rather than conjectural or hy-
pothetical, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and (3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision. 59
The requirement of an "injury in fact" was central to the Court's deter-
mination in Save Our Springs. For purposes of the present analysis, the
most notable of the various injuries alleged by S.O.S. as evidence of its
associational standing to challenge the Development Agreements was its
claim that increased pollution in the aquifer would result in injury of
local self-government, impairing the preservation of a republican form of government, and
contracting away legislative powers," and on the grounds that the City of Dripping Springs
violated the Open Meetings Act in the scope of its public notice of meetings related to
consideration of the Development Agreements. Id. at 877.
54. Id. at 876. The trial court also granted summary judgment to defendants on the
S.O.S. Open Meetings Act claims. Id. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed this decision,
holding that the notices met the statutory requirements of section 551.041 of the Texas
Government Code, specifically finding that the notices stated (1) the parties involved, (2)
the type of agreement at issue, (3) that extraterritorial jurisdiction would be impacted, and
(4) that action might be taken at the meeting to approve the agreements. See id. at 889-90.
55. See id. at 877-78 (noting that "standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion," which a plaintiff must establish before a court may decide the merits of the plaintiff's
claims).
56. See id. at 878 (emphasis added).
57. Id. (citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tex.
1993)).
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
2011]
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"members who enjoy Barton Springs pool and its surroundings for its
recreational, scenic, or scientific value."' 60 The court of appeals roundly
rejected the indirect environmental injuries S.O.S. offered as a basis for
standing under Texas law, noting that the cases S.O.S. cited recognized
"environmental harm" as a basis for standing for plaintiffs whose own
property would be affected by the challenged actions.61 It took special
issue with the organization's reading of Texas Rivers Protection Associa-
tion v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission,62 a decision
S.O.S. cited as a basis for finding recreational and environmental harm as
sufficient injury to establish standing.63 The court clarified that while the
Texas Rivers court did recognize that "environmental harm may be a cog-
nizable injury for purposes of standing," the case "does not stand for the
proposition that an allegation of any type of recreational or environmen-
tal impact, by itself, constitutes an injury in fact sufficient to confer stand-
ing." 64 Ultimately, the court reaffirmed that under Texas law, injury to
environmental, scientific, or recreational interests will not confer standing
without some interest in the plaintiff's own property making the injury
"sufficiently particularized" to distinguish it from harm experienced by
the general public. 65
The organization's arguments resting on federal case law were rejected
by the court of appeals as well. 66 Perhaps recognizing the difficulty it
would face in proving standing under state law without a property inter-
est in Barton Springs, S.O.S. cited various federal cases recognizing gen-
eralized environmental harm as a cognizable injury for purposes of
standing. 67 The court acknowledged that federal courts had found stand-
ing based on harm to "aesthetic and recreational values," even when the
plaintiff did not possess a property right where the alleged environmental
harm occurred. 68
60. id. S.O.S. also alleged that: members living near the land subject to the Develop-
ment Agreement were concerned about pollution of their well-water; members who are
residents of Dripping Springs suggested the Development Agreements "injured their pro-
cedural interests in using democratic means to prevent development activities that would
further pollute Barton Springs; ... members who pay property taxes to the City" were
injured by the expenditure of public funds under the Development Agreements; and mem-
bers living near the proposed developments were injured due to increased lights, increased
road traffic, and decreased property values.
61. Id. at 879 (emphasis added). The cases cited by S.O.S. included Lake Medina Con-
servation Soc'y v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 980 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1998, pet. denied), where an organization had standing to sue on behalf of owners
of waterfront property and waterfront businesses; and Heat Energy Advanced Tech., Inc.
v. W. Dallas Coal. for Envtl. Justice, 962 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. de-
nied), where an organization had standing to challenge a permit application based upon a
member's proximity to the proposed facility.
62. 910 S.W.2d 147, 147 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
63. Save Our Springs, 304 S.W.3d at 879.
64. Id. at 879-80 (emphasis added).
65. See id. at 880.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id. Of the cases presumably cited by S.O.S., the court specifically notes Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), and Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
[Vol. 64
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The court concluded, however, that the federal cases S.O.S. cited to
support its claim of standing in state court involved the application of
federal environmental statutes. 69 These statutes not only prohibit the
type of conduct the plaintiffs challenged in each case, they also provide
for a private right of action allowing any "citizen" to bring a challenge to
enforce the environmental standard in question.70 These are the citizen
suits discussed above. The court concluded that a plaintiff citing injury to
environmental, scientific, or recreational interests under federal environ-
mental statutes possesses a "legally protected interest for purposes of
standing" because the statute grants a private right of action to protect
those same interests. 71
This case presents interesting issues and comparisons of Texas environ-
mental statutes and federal environmental statutes that contain citizen
suit provisions. The standing for plaintiffs bringing a citizen suit may be
somewhat loosened. However, over the last few years, the U.S. Supreme
Court has begun to take a harder look at these cases and appears to be
tightening the standing requirements, requiring that associations have
plaintiffs that have more concrete injuries that address the constitutional
standing requirements and the elements of standing under the federal test
proscribed by the Supreme Court. The state courts may be moving to-
ward a tighter standard for standing as well. This case may indicate a
trend to closer review of the injury a party or its association is asserting it
will suffer without being allowed to participate in a legal proceeding.
B. CORPORATE INTERVENTION IN LITIGATION OVER ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS TO PROTECT PROPERTY RIGHTS
In another case, the issue of the rights of several business related as-
sociations and individual companies attempting to intervene in an envi-
ronmental suit over the impact of water management raised interesting
issues and outcomes with respect to the ability of these organizations to
participate in litigation to protect their property rights and other
concerns.
The case, Aransas Project v. Shaw, was brought to protect whooping
cranes and other species under the Endangered Species Act.72 The Aran-
sas Project is a non-profit corporation that challenged the TCEQ and the
South Texas Watermaster for their management of water entering the San
Antonio Bay ecosystem, claiming the reduced water flow resulted in in-
creased salinity and other impacts that adversely affected the whooping
Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) as the basis for its summary of the test of standing under
federal law.
69. Id. at 880-81.
70. Id. at 880.
71. See id. at 881. The Court acknowledges two Texas cases where the court recog-
nized that "harm for purposes of standing may be 'economic, recreational, or environmen-
tal,"' but it dismissed both cases as "connected to federal case law in which a federal
statute protected such interests." Id. at 881 n.6.




The issue before the federal district court was the right of business as-
sociations and individual business entities to intervene in the suit to pro-
tect their interests.74 The organization's concern was that if more water
was released to the bay, the vested water rights of the members of the
associations or the entities would be reduced, affecting the parties' legal
rights. 75 The parties that sought to intervene were the Texas Chemical
Council, Union Carbide Corporation, the Texas Farm Bureau and Ameri-
can Farm Bureau Federation, the San Antonio Water System, and CPS
Energy.
The test the court applied was the ability to intervene as a matter of
right under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
whether the party has "a direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in
the action, meaning that the interest be one which the substantive law
recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the applicant. '"76 The party
must also show that other parties will not adequately represent their
interests.77
With respect to the Texas Chemical Council, the court noted the 66,000
acre feet held by specific members. The court concluded based on Texas
precedent that although water rights are the property of the state, the
permit to use the water is considered a vested property right that may be
impaired by the outcome of the lawsuit.78
The court also considered the ability of the governmental defendants to
protect the private party rights. The court considered Fifth Circuit prece-
dent and concluded that the governmental agencies would follow the pol-
icy interests of the state, but would not necessarily act to protect the
interests of the Texas Chemical Council. Thus, the court allowed the as-
sociation to intervene to protect its members' interests.79
The court then reviewed the other parties moving for intervention.
The court concluded that they met most of the elements for a right of
intervention, including whether the lawsuit would affect the water rights
of the parties or its members. The issue was whether their interests
would be represented by other parties in the litigation. The court con-
73. See id. at *4-5.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *9.
76. Id. at *13-14 (quoting In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 570 F.3d 244, 250 (5th Cir.
2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). "[I]t is plain that something more
than an economic interest is necessary." New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe
Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir. 1984). The "'interest' test is primarily a practical
guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many apparently concerned persons as is
compatible with efficiency and due process." Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207 (5th
Cir. 1994).
77. Aransas Project, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59965, at *22 (citing Trbovich v. United
Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972)). "The burden of establishing inade-
quate representation is on the applicant for intervention." Edwards v. City of Houston, 78
F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996).
78. Id. at *14-22.
79. See id. at *22-30.
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cluded that with the intervention of the Texas Chemical Council com-
bined with the governmental entities, the other parties' rights and
interests would be protected.80
However, in considering the ability of the other parties to intervene not
as of right but under the permissive provision of the intervention rule, the
court concluded that the Texas Farm Bureau, the American Farm Bureau
Federation, the San Antonio Water System, and CPS Energy could file
amicus curiae briefs in the case and participate in that limited fashion.81
The court's review of the ability to intervene in litigation raises ques-
tions of whether parties have the right to defend their own property
rights or whether the court will allow third parties to act to protect those
rights. While judicial resources must be conserved and practical manage-
ment of cases is necessary, the ability of third parties to address water use
rights may present critical questions as to whether parties, who may be
affected profoundly by litigation, must rely on other parties to address
their interests. One question is what if the third parties settle with the
plaintiffs and drop out of the case. Will then the other parties who sought
intervention as a matter of right have another opportunity to intervene?
Or will the case be too far developed for them to adequately participate
at that point? Or would the courts allow such late intervention, since
timely intervention is a part of the evaluation of whether parties will be
allowed to intervene? These are important questions for affected parties
and courts to consider in determining who may intervene in litigation that
may impact multiple parties who were not the original plaintiffs or de-
fendants in the matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
The first issue in this Survey period was the important matter of when a
party can obtain contribution under Texas law for the costs of remediat-
ing contaminated properties from other parties who caused, contributed
to, or were otherwise liable for all or part of the contamination. The
ability to recover from these parties in many cases provides a fair appor-
tionment of the costs among multiple liable parties. In other cases, it may
allow some parties to collect all of the costs from the party or parties that
caused the contamination. Thus, these are important issues for courts to
work through.
The second issue arises when parties attempt to challenge environmen-
tal permits, file lawsuits, or intervene in lawsuits to protect their interests
in the relevant proceedings. The question of standing or right of inter-
vention continues to evolve under both federal and state environmental
statutes, procedural rules, and constitutional rights.
80. See id. at *30-47.
81. See id. at *30-50.
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The cases discussed in this Survey provide practitioners with key hold-
ings to consider in filing, intervening, or defending claims in administra-
tive and judicial proceedings.
